The KGB in Your Pocket
It goes without saying that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 changed virtually every aspect of Russian life. In June 2026, Moscow experienced its largest aerial attack since World War II, which targeted fuel depots and forced Russian citizens to wait for days in mile-long lines to fill up their gas tanks. While Putin’s authoritarian government is careful to avoid the word “war” on the battlefront and in the media, it is clear that this reality has extended past Ukrainian soil to affect both the physical and digital lives of average citizens.
I am one of these average Russian citizens, a bilingual journalist who often works with Western clients. Since 2022, however, I have taken on a new role—that of my family’s systems manager, installing working VPNs and proxies to help them outmaneuver government surveillance and restrictions on communication. Once reserved for dissidents, these constraints have now become the norm for the entire online Russian population.
Less than a month after invading Ukraine, the Russian government classified Meta as an extremist organization and officially banned its social media platforms, which include Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook. In the case of Telegram, despite its 95.7 million monthly users in Russia (more than two-thirds of the entire population), the government successfully re-enacted in April 2026 its 2018 attempt to block access for its citizens.
Nearly 64 million people in Russia still use Instagram, almost exactly the same number as before the ban, and Telegram continues to be the primary messaging platform for the urban population. But what is different now is that access to these platforms requires a VPN—ideally at least four different VPN options to ensure unhindered usage—and, for Telegram specifically, a battery-killing and computer-crashing system of proxies.
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At parties (which are less frequent these days), we debate which VPNs work best, share proxy lists, and discuss which apps and services are most reliable for calls within Russia and abroad. Recently, we have turned to snickering at the government’s newest scheme—the messenger MAX, a carbon copy of Telegram’s interface, but with the added feature of government spyware.
The government designated MAX as Russia’s official messenger in July 2025 and mandated its use across all government institutions, including schools and hospitals. By February 2026, it had reportedly reached 77.5 million monthly users. In fact, it has now been forced into almost every avenue of average consumerism, including the purchasing of alcohol and cigarettes in self-checkout kiosks. (In a very Russian fashion, a black market soon sprang up, exploited mainly by teenagers buying accounts to provide verification they are over eighteen.)
Who are these 77.5 million users? A few weeks ago, I received a flurry of messages from my child’s teacher on a school-related Telegram channel, begging the parents to enlist anyone and everyone—grandparents, friends, the goddamn cat—to join the class’s MAX group by the end of the day, lest the school be sanctioned by the Ministry of Education. It felt like nobody would care if we invited the local pedophile, as long as we hit the required numbers.
I didn’t join the MAX group—not from my main device, that is. The reason is straightforward: MAX sends random requests to Russian and foreign IPs to identify those using traffic-splitting VPNs, and thereby connects directly to local and foreign services through the VPN. In other words, the app snitches on your VPN to the government and this data, one assumes, is used to teach AI systems to better detect VPN traffic and block it more effectively. As Russia’s official messenger application, MAX operates under SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities) legislation, a project with roots in the KGB practice of maintaining dedicated rooms at every city telephone exchange where agents could monitor communications at will.
VKontakte (VK), the company that operates MAX and serves as Russia’s primary social media platform, is legally required to provide the state security services (FSB) with access to its infrastructure. Essentially, MAX requests screen recording access at the operating-system level, even though it does not have a screen recording feature. The cameras are pinged without actually being used, and the mute button does not fully mute the mic; it only stops sending audio to your interlocutor. The user essentially hands MAX the keys to their entire digital life: from correspondence and calls to location data, passwords, and the ability to surveil via the camera.
The extent to which MAX is more bark than bite is hard to determine. But I’m not willing to find out on my main phone. Like many others, I make use of what’s become known as a “Maxophone”—a device, usually an old iPhone or a cheap Android, that I use exclusively for MAX. I keep Telegram, Instagram, YouTube, and all other services on my main phone. And while I only use my real phone with VPNs, it remains unclear if one or more of these apps share my data with the government.
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A few months ago, Moscow residents encountered another digital catastrophe. In March 2026, soon after the US strike on Iran and the assassination of the Ayatollah, the internet in the capital went fully down: no maps, taxis, carsharing, payment terminals, music streaming, messaging beyond SMS—literally nothing. Walking through the city center, citizens joked about a forced digital detox. It had never been easier to catch the eye of a passer-by.
A few days later, some local services began to work, as well as, for whatever reason, any domain ending in ‘co.uk’. This was evidently the government’s first test of a “whitelist internet” in the capital. Instead of blocking traffic, they only allowed access to a kind of sandbox internet of approved websites. A researcher tested approximately 1 million domains and discovered that only around a thousand were included in the whitelist—0.1% of the global web.
This blackout was shocking for many Moscow residents, who have continued throughout the war to enjoy the privileges of living in the Russian cultural epicenter with access to resources and relative safety from the realities of war. It felt ostensibly different for those living in smaller cities and rural areas, where mobile internet blackouts are more common. In these areas, especially those close to the Russo-Ukrainian border prone to regular Ukrainian drone attacks, proper internet access has been increasingly unavailable since 2023. (However, as of summer 2026, drones are reaching deeper into Russian territory with corresponding limitations on Internet access.) In response, it has become the norm to download maps for offline use, use landlines to order taxis, and send texts instead of messages. Card terminals in these places have become unreliable; cash circulation across Russia has increased almost fivefold in three months. The digital lives of a twenty-two-year-old in Moscow and another in Kursk, located on the way from Ukraine to Moscow “as the drone flies,” differ starkly.
Hijacking the Free Internet
Today’s developments would have stunned an unwitting time traveler from just one or two decades ago. Around the year 2000, the Russian internet was among the most open and dynamic in the world, with companies from around the world competing to win over Russian programmers and computer scientists. As early as the 1990s, Russia’s digital infrastructure had begun to outpace the rest of the world, eventually leading to nationwide LTE coverage, secure banking, and digitized government services. Most notable was Russia’s main search engine, Yandex, which developed into an extensive ecosystem that included cloud storage, maps, taxi and car sharing, music streaming, delivery services, and smart speakers with an integrated AI assistant called Alisa. In the 2010s, nearly two-thirds of Russian users preferred Yandex over Google.
The truth is that Russia’s internet (or the RuNet, colloquially) would likely not have achieved its status without the financial help of the country’s oligarchs, specifically Boris Berezovsky, a former Putin ally who was politically assassinated in 2013 while living in exile in London. In the mid-90s, he invested around $4 million in Russia’s first internet provider and hired an army of ambitious content creators to build the RuNet from scratch. One such creator was Artemy Lebedev, who became Russia’s leading web developer and the architect of the RuNet’s news and blog networks.
Lebedev was known for his digital presence on virtually every platform, serving as the de facto face of the Russian internet. While he was often vocally critical of Russian digital and industrial design, as well as many political and cultural events in Russia, he was fundamentally patriotic, hoping to identify weak spots in Russian digital infrastructure and design culture and troubleshoot these issues. By the early 2000s, Lebedev’s eponymous design studio had begun collaborating with nearly all major Russian brands, and eventually with many governmental agencies.
Although he still insists on his independence of thought, Lebedev today often echoes Kremlin propaganda. After the Russian occupation of Donetsk in 2022, for example, he visited the city and praised the conditions under Russian control. Lebedev’s patriotism has won him many favors among Russia’s political elite. Despite being sanctioned, forbidden from traveling to Europe, and having his weekly news show banned on YouTube, Lebedev continues to broadcast on VK Video and on Instagram, where he spouts the classic conservative talking points—the migrant crisis, rampant violence in Europe, the inclusion of trans athletes in sports, as well as the obstinance of European and Ukrainian politicians on these issues. Many who had once viewed him as a promising voice of opposition have been forced to bow their heads in disappointment.
Witnessing Russia’s trajectory from world leader in digital innovation to totalitarian suppressor of internet usage across the last thirty years, and watching many of the very technologies and companies that symbolized that innovation become absorbed into the machinery of state propaganda, has been terrifying, to say the least. Although Russia is not alone in its rampant corruption and attacks on its neighbors, or even in its enthusiasm for filling the informational space with post-truth rhetoric, it remains likely the most influential writer of the modern post-truth playbook. With its crackdown on freedom of information, assembly, and the press—and now on the digital sphere—it is blazing a new trail, attempting to turn a developed, digitized nation into a controlled environment where all advertising, information, and services are regulated.
Many experts draw parallels between Russian and Chinese early approaches to internet surveillance, but the comparison obscures more than it reveals. China’s information architecture was originally built with containment in mind: a stable government in the 1990s and a cohesive internet policy recognized early that the internet was a political medium and designed its infrastructure accordingly. During that same period, Russia was in a state of disarray, with different factions vying for political control. The internet arrived here as a kind of gift—open, exhilarating, and genuinely free—and the Kremlin only understood what it had surrendered once it was too late to replicate the Chinese model. What followed was not a strategy but a reaction, and reactions, by nature, are cruder than long-term plans.
Where China pursues a specific ideological project—the management of a singular official reality—Russia’s approach has often been the opposite: the deliberate proliferation of contradictory realities. This is the KGB playbook updated for the algorithmic age, the logic that Steve Bannon once summarized as “flooding the zone with shit” (a strategy the Trump administration, too, has successfully exploited). The aim is not to persuade the audience of a particular truth but to make truth itself feel unresolvable. The downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014 is a revealing example: in the aftermath, Russian state media and affiliated outlets deliberately flooded the information space with dozens of competing accounts, each internally plausible but collectively paralyzing.
Despite the Kremlin’s pervasive state propaganda, the RuNet still functioned as a useful space for both creativity and business. Take the digital realities during the COVID-lockdowns, for example. The lives of Russian citizens, like the rest of the world, shifted online. Screen times ballooned. For many of us, social media became central to both our entertainment and livelihood.
In 2020, I was paying 400 rubles per month (approximately €5) for unlimited 4G internet on my smartphone, which allowed me to watch YouTube videos, record TikToks, and buy a staggering number of products from micro-businesses on Instagram. When I posted on Facebook looking for work, I received hundreds of offers within 24 hours, many from foreign companies. After the job was completed, my invoiced amount was converted into rubles and deposited straight into my Russian bank account without any complications.
Many used Instagram to jump-start their careers and launch their businesses, with approximately half of all small and medium businesses operating without websites in 2020. For instant messaging, we relied exclusively on Telegram as a faster and more user-friendly alternative to WhatsApp. A nascent media culture was born on its channels—everyone and anyone could find memes, news, political discourse, niche interests, and academic analysis.
The government, aided by the regulatory agency Rozkomnadzor (in practice a sort of Internet watchdog), had already attempted to block Telegram in 2018. But in April 2020, it was forced to concede after failing to provide a reasonable messaging alternative and realizing that interference could not put even a small dent in the app’s usage. In fact, between 2018 and 2020, the number of Russian Telegram users doubled, rising from 15 to 30 million. Many learned the terms ‘proxy’ and ‘VPN’ during this time and began regularly using these workarounds to access Telegram—a skill that would come in extremely handy to anyone living in Russia a few years later.
During that same period, Telegram further solidified its position as the platform for meaningful organization, from birthday parties and parent-teacher chats to residential building management and political protests. Months before the ban was lifted, the Russian government itself launched a Telegram channel to inform the public about COVID-related matters.
The freedom offered in this online reality stood in stark contrast to the political reality on the streets. There was a notable lack of opposition at any meaningful level of power; “institutional opposition” focused on little more than fixing children’s playgrounds and potholes. Protests were violently broken up by armed police, and yet this didn’t stop us from flocking to the streets in thousands to make our voices heard. Such was the case in 2019, when the journalist Ilya Golunov was arrested on fabricated drug charges. Many major newspapers, invigorated by the public outcry, joined the cause and published “Я/Мы Иван Голунов” [I am/We are Ivan Golunov] on their covers.
This image was quickly adopted as the profile picture for thousands of users. Photos of the protest spread online too, surreal in its coincidence with the public festival “Times and Epochs,” which meant that protesters were surrounded by festivalgoers wearing togas, Viking helmets, and traditional Slavic costumes. A man managed to play a few bars of Viktor Tsoi’s famous protest song “Перемен” [Changes] on his guitar. People clad in traditional Russian chainmail looked on in confusion as the singer was dragged away by the police.
Golunov was released a couple days later, and the policemen responsible for the setup were fired: a genuine and exceptionally rare win for Russian civil society. By the first half of 2020, despite growing pressure from the state and obvious COVID anxiety, there was also a sincere sense of optimism that we were living in a society that, even if plagued by issues, had genuine potential and was actively making strides towards a brighter future. While very small shifts towards online censorship were already taking place, it felt futile. The rollback of the Telegram ban and its growth proved this. The old world was buckling under the pressure of the new, digital one, that would be impossible to contain. This was progress, the natural order of things.
We were vastly underestimating the capacity of the Russian government to disrupt nature.
Pinpricking a Pressurized Container
In 2026, Russia is embroiled in the fifth year of the war in Ukraine. Every month, thousands die on both sides. There has only been one anti-war protest within Russia since 2022; it was brutally suppressed and many of its participants were incarcerated. Almost every organization within Russia supporting dissidents has been dismantled, with only a few that managed to escape operating in a limited capacity from abroad. Prominent opposition politicians, as well as anyone with a platform who expresses views that challenge the government’s official position, have been designated foreign agents. This ascription comes at a huge price: not only is your access to banking significantly limited, but you are also banned from teaching or holding any prominent public positions, and must disclose your ‘foreign agent’ status in any published texts or videos.
Although Russian Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat are oversaturated with funny skits, self-improvement content, and the occasional take on pop culture, any form of political reporting or commentary from people still in the country has been noticeably absent. But that, too, has recently started to change.
In April 2026, one public figure managed to break through the constant hum of apolitical broadcasting. The former reality star Viktoria Bonya made headlines with an eighteen-minute Instagram video directly addressing Putin, in which she erred a list of complaints about Russia’s failed domestic policies that have culminated in disastrous consequences: frequent internet shutdowns, flooding in Dagestan, Black Sea oil pollution, livestock culls in Siberia, and intensified pressure on small businesses. In the video, which garnered over 30 million views on Instagram, Bonya pointedly identified herself as “a person with a heart” speaking for the Russian people rather than as a member of the political opposition. “There is a huge wall between you and us ordinary Russian people,” she says to Putin in the video. “If there is any blow against me, then it will be a blow against the people.” Ultimately, Bonya protected herself by resorting to the classical Russian trope “Good tsar, bad boyars”—framing sensitive topics as a failure of management rather than the country’s leadership.
This video generated hundreds of video responses, many supporting Bonya and extending her argument into other policy areas. Thousands of memes portraying Bonya as a revolutionary circulated the RuNet, as did discussions of her video in countless Telegram groups. Her willingness to address Putin in such a public way (albeit from her home in Monaco) invigorated the Russian people’s long-suppressed thirst for change and representation. It seemed for a short window of time that meaningful action had been resurrected from the streets to the digital realm.
Despite the initial loud wave of resistance from Putin loyalists, the administration could not ignore the fallout from Bonya’s video and its resonance with the Russian people. The president’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov acknowledged her directly and assured the public that the government was taking the issues she identified very seriously. Even the loud and blood-thirsty propagandist Vladimir Soloviev was forced to backpedal his original designation of her as a foreign agent and “worn-out slut” by inviting her to a debate on his online show, which he began with an apology.
Bonya’s viral video, although an isolated event, captures the tension at the heart of contemporary Russian lived experience. As a pinprick, her video let out a considerable amount of air from a pressurized container. Regular people, however, without a considerable platform of followers lack the same opportunities to voice their dissent, for fear of government retaliation against them or their loved ones.
Still, the summer of 2026 has seen a renewed sense of solidarity online that many had come to believe was impossible. Putin’s government has tried with all its might to portray the war as inevitably victorious for Russia, but the toll it has taken on daily life within the country—with gas shortages, inflation, street violence, and an astronomically rising death toll—make this façade much more difficult to uphold. Many have captured this reality and shared it online: videos of people waiting for days in their cars to fill up their gas tanks; men being abducted off the street and forced to sign contracts deploying them to war as their wives cry in the background; and war amputees terrorizing government agents with knives. In reclaiming their voices online, Russians are now posting reels asking when this nightmare will finally end.
And yet, the regime’s crackdown on information still threatens our general ability to connect, not just with the outside world, but with each other. There is still a notable divide amongst political and generational lines: those without the resources to leave Russia witness the older generation’s support for the regime, or their Soviet-era attitude to lay low and mind one’s own business. The younger generation, many of whom have grown up with limited access to information, are forced to navigate the “whitelist” internet, where the government controls the narrative by propagating disinformation. Many have accepted this fate, and in this sense, been neutralized. Their ability to think critically or engage with different discourse has been significantly weakened.
The question remains: what actions qualify as dissent, once taking to the streets is no longer an option? In accordance with the totalitarian playbook identified by Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, the government’s arbitrary arrests and ever-encroaching surveillance have left us embroiled in a state of perpetual paranoia. For the generation that grew up with a free internet, discourse remains the fundamental lens through which we encounter the world. For those of us stuck in Russia, VPNs have become a channel for civic action. While it may look to the outside world like VPNs are a mere technical workaround to resolve a minor inconvenience, from the inside, they are vital, enabling the last available form of contact with a world that still assumes that information should be free. We connect not because we expect great change, but because the alternative—accepting the whitelist, downloading MAX, internalizing state-sponsored narratives—feels like a different kind of death.
Will Bonya’s video change anything? Probably not. But it still matters because thirty million people, within and outside of Russia, watched it and recognized themselves. In a country where cemeteries are expanding faster than the regime can account for them, the only permitted narrative is that of Russian hegemony and victory, recognition itself has become a form of resistance. Many of us who remain refuse to be alienated—from the world and from each other. We feel trapped here, waiting in fear for a military summons, most of us simply trying to connect with one another and retain a sense of truth and community amidst a sea of lies. The internet, even this broken, surveilled, throttled version of it, is still the place where that can happen.
Editorial assistance: Sasha Shapiro
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Bio.:
Vladimir Konchayev is the pseudonym of a journalist living in Russia. Although
Berlin Review generally does not publish writing under pseudonyms, one is used in this case for the protection of the author.
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